Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise by Michael J. Enright
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the
Organization of Enterprise
Volume Author/Editor: Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M.G. Raff, Editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-46820-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/lamo95-1
Conference Date: October 23-24, 1992
Publication Date: January 1995
Chapter Title: Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated
Industries
Chapter Author: Michael J. Enright
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8751
Chapter pages in book: (p. 103 - 146)4  Organization and Coordination 
in Geographically Concentrated 
Industries 
Michael J. Enright 
Economic activity requires the coordination  of a variety of functions within 
and between firms. The organization of economic activity and the mechanisms 
used to coordinate  such activity have become increasingly central issues for 
industrial economists and business strategists. While economists explore the 
advantages of markets versus hierarchies, business strategists are turning their 
attention to the notion of the boundaryless firm, and historians are studying the 
evolution of coordination mechanisms in particular companies and industries 
(see Williamson  1985; Hirshhorn and Gilmore 1992; papers in this volume). 
In  this  regard,  geographically  concentrated  industries,  industries  in  which 
many or most of the competitors are located in close proximity, provide unique 
opportunities to examine the organization of economic activity and the nature 
of  coordination both within and among firms. The main reason  is that geo- 
graphic concentration increases the effectiveness of the external coordination 
mechanisms available to firms, and therefore allows for a wider variety of orga- 
nizational forms and coordination  mechanisms than might otherwise be ob- 
served. The boundaries between firms in such industries are sometimes blurred 
and often fluid, tending to respond to changes in product, technology, markets, 
competition, and government policy. 
The first section of  this paper introduces  the phenomenon  of  geographic 
concentration,  or localization,  in industry. Particular attention is paid to the 
industrial organization of localized industries and the influence of localization 
on firm structures and incentives. Section 4.2 discusses the evolution of organi- 
zational forms and coordination mechanisms in three localized industries: the 
Hollywood  motion  picture  industry,  the Prato-area  textile  industry,  and the 
Swiss watch industry. Though each example discusses the historical develop- 
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ment of organization and coordination in the localized industry, the focus is on 
the transformations that have taken place in the twentieth century. Section 4.3 
explores some of the implications of the present work for students of economic 
and business organizations. 
4.1  Geographically Concentrated Industries 
Firms in a given industry are often located in close proximity to each other.’ 
Geographic concentration within industries is pervasive, spanning large por- 
tions of the economies of  most nations. In the United States, Detroit, Holly- 
wood, Wall Street, Madison Avenue, Silicon Valley, and Route 128 are associ- 
ated with particular industries. The world’s two leading motorcycle companies 
and two leading musical instrument producers grew up in the Japanese city of 
Hamamatsu. Three of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures produce the vast majority 
of  the nation’s  silk and woven  synthetic fabrics, whereas nearby  companies 
account for the bulk of Japanese textile machinery, synthetic fiber, and carbon- 
fiber production. All of  Germany’s leading cutlery firms are located in Sol- 
ingen, whereas the pen and pencil industries are centered in Nuremberg, opti- 
cal equipment in Oberkochen and Wetzlar, tooling in Remscheid, and jewelry 
in Pforzheim. In Switzerland, Geneva and the Jura area are the centers of the 
watch  industry;  Base1 is  the  home  of  the  Swiss  dye,  pharmaceutical,  and 
freight-forwarding industries; and Zurich is the center for banking, trading, 
and other financial services. Some of the most striking examples of localized 
industries are found in  Italy. Sassuolo, a small town near Bologna, produces 
roughly 35 percent of  the world’s ceramic tiles.  Montebelluna, in the Dolo- 
mites, supplies approximately 50 percent of the world’s ski boots. Carrara is 
by  far the world’s leading center for stonecutting. Two areas, Arezzo and Va- 
lenza Po, account for more than $2 billion in precious-metal jewelry exports 
each year. Bologna is the home of  nearly two hundred packaging machinery 
firms. Prato and Biella account for approximately 80 percent of Italy’s wool 
textile output. 
Despite the importance of geographically concentrated industries in most 
economies, such industries have only recently begun to capture the imagina- 
tion of economists and business strategists.* Efforts to explain the development 
and dynamism of  areas such as northern  Italy and to explore what might be 
termed non-Chandlerian business development, or development through clus- 
ters  of  small firms rather than  large managerial  firms (see Chandler  1990), 
have inevitably focused on geographically concentrated industries. The present 
work seeks to add to the growing literature on this important topic. 
I. For a more complete description of the industrial organization of geographically concentrated 
industries, see Enright 1990. 
2. Porter (1990) emphasizes the role of localization in the development of internationally suc- 
cessful industries. Krugman (1991) terms localization the most striking feature of the geography 
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There are two types  of  localized industries. The first is characterized by 
increasing returns that are internal to the firm, while the second is character- 
ized by increasing returns that are external to any single firm. Some industries 
are dominated by  a small  number of  firms with  production concentrated  at 
one or a few facilities. One would expect such industries to be geographically 
concentrated. In the extreme case of ever-increasing returns at the plant level, 
one would expect to see an industry with a single-facility monopolist exhib- 
iting maximum geographic concentration. The large commercial airframe and 
large jet engine industries in the United States have structures that approach 
this extreme. 
The second, and in many ways more interesting, phenomenon is that of geo- 
graphic clusters of firms in an industry. In such industries, the structure of firms 
influences, and is influenced by, the localization of industry. Localization leads 
to the development of external economies in terms of information flow, knowl- 
edge spillovgs, and contacts with suppliers and buyers. Localization is often 
associated with low levels of vertical integration and diversification. In local- 
ized industries, geographic concentration may serve to limit the disadvantages 
that small firms face with respect to larger, vertically integrated firms. Local- 
ization can also facilitate the negotiation and monitoring of collusive arrange- 
ments among firms. 
4.1.1  Clusters of Firms and External Economies 
Firms within  a geographic cluster are often able to draw advantage from 
their local environment. Marshall (1920, 1923) pointed out the importance of 
external economies that can arise from the concentration of many similar firms 
in the same location in the development of firms, especially in industries that 
require specific skills. Marshall’s description of localized industries remains 
perhaps the most insightful in the literature. 
When an industry had chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there 
long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled 
trade get from their neighborhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade 
become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and children learn many 
of them unconsciously.  Good work is rightly  appreciated,  inventions  and 
improvements in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the 
business have their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, 
it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and 
thus  becomes  the  source of  further new  ideas.  And  presently  subsidiary 
trades grow up in the neighborhood, supplying it with implements and mate- 
rials, organizing its traffic, and in many ways conducing to the economy of 
its material. (1920, 225) 
External economies encourage the localization of production in industries 
characterized by limited economies of scale. Although one might expect such 
industries to spread over space to serve geographically dispersed customers, 
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can cause clusters of firms to develop around sources of the necessary expertise 
and inputs. The Sassuolo-area ceramic-tile industry provides a good example. 
Demand for ceramic tiles is widespread, both in Italy and the rest of the world. 
Many other building-materials  industries are geographically  dispersed rather 
than concentrated. The efficient scale for ceramic-tile production is the single 
production line, which represents a small fraction (well under 1 percent) of the 
total market. Economies of  scale in ceramic tile production  are limited, but 
access to knowledge of the complex material transformation process and spe- 
cialized  suppliers  (several of  which  operate in  industries  with  significantly 
larger economies of scale than tile production) helps keep the industry local- 
ized in Sassuolo. 
The evolution of  clusters  of  suppliers,  customers,  and competitors  is ex- 
tremely  important  to the development  of  localized  industries3 The external 
economies that such clusters create in terms of information flow and the spread 
of  knowledge  appear to give localized  firms advantages in a wide range of 
industries. In many cases, suppliers and equipment manufacturers work closely 
with their local customers to develop new and improved  products. Ongoing 
contact between buyer and supplier promotes rapid information flow and joint 
efforts to solve pressing problems. Local firms often serve as test sites for new 
ideas, or for the optimization of inputs and equipment. In return, they tend to 
receive exclusive use of the ideas, inputs, and equipment, at least for a short 
pcriod of time. Outsiders must often be content with older inputs and equip- 
ment. The Sassuolo ceramic-tile industry, in which many technical advances 
were developed through the efforts of tile firms and equipment manufacturers, 
provides a good example of joint problem  solving.  One such advance,  the 
single-firing process, reduced the cycle time for a batch of ceramic tiles from 
forty-eight hours to fifty minutes (Enright and Tenti 1990). Although the new 
technology caught on rapidly in and around Sassuolo, it was several years be- 
fore equipment embodying the new technology was sold outside the area. 
4.1.2  Firm Structures in Localized Industries 
Firms within a geographic cluster often exhibit lower levels of vertical inte- 
gration than their dispersed counterparts. Bologna-area packaging-machinery 
firms, for example, subcontract out a far higher proportion of their production 
than their competitors both inside and outside Italy. The same is true of Sassu- 
010  ceramic-tile manufacturers. In Prato, there is no such thing as a vertically 
integrated textile firm. Each company concentrates on a single stage, such as 
spinning, in the production process. A single wool textile can go through five 
or six firms before it is finished. The synthetic fabric industry in Fukui, Ishi- 
kawa, and Toyama exhibits a similar level of disintegration. There are hundreds 
of small firms in Solingen that perform a single step in the cutlery production 
3. See, for example, Hoover and Vernon 1959; Brusco 1982: Oakey 1985; Becattini 1987, 1989; 
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process. A single product will normally pass through many craft shops before 
it is finished. The Piacenza-area  manufacturers  of factory automation equip- 
ment are among the least vertically integrated in the world. Several companies 
actually do no metal bending, preferring to subcontract for all component pro- 
duction and to concentrate on assembly and software development. 
Localization can influence the vertical  structure of industries in two ways. 
The first is through the impact of the extent of the local market on the vertical 
structure of firms. Stigler (1951) points out that, as an industry increases in 
size, firms may start to specialize in certain activities, particularly those subject 
to increasing returns to scale over some range of output. He concludes that 
localization  increases the effective economic size of  an industry,  allows for 
gains from specialization,  and results  in lower levels of  vertical  integration 
than are seen among geographically  dispersed firms. Evans (1972) predicts 
that functions with an optimal scale larger than that required by a single firm 
will tend to be performed by separate firms. Co-location of firms in a given 
industry allows each activity to achieve its optimal scale. Though such activi- 
ties could be undertaken by one of the firms in the original industry, Evans 
concludes that firms will generally not wish to buy from a competitor. Thus 
localization results in the emergence of supplier firms and lower levels of verti- 
cal integration than would otherwise occur. 
Localization  can also influence the vertical  structure of  firms through  its 
impact on the costs of transactions, including the costs of negotiating and mon- 
itoring contracts and the costs associated with the potential for opportunistic 
behavior. When suppliers and buyers are physically close together, negotiations 
and monitoring become less costly. This will be true if information is transmit- 
ted through personal contact, communication  costs increase with distance, or 
if there is a degradation in communication with increased distance. In addition, 
some localized  industries  develop  standardized  transactions  and a common 
language that lower the cost of negotiation. In the Prato wool textile industry 
and the Japanese synthetic weave industry, standard contracts have developed 
that reduce the time and cost of negotiation. The Hollywood motion picture 
industry routinized the casting of extras through Central Casting in the 1920s. 
More recently, area-specific guild and union contracts have standardized many 
of the industry’s  transaction^.^ The repeated close-quarter transactions and cul- 
tural similarities often allow localized industries to develop such mechanisms 
even when dispersed firms do not. 
Localization  can also improve the effectiveness of market transactions  by 
reducing  the chances that  a firm might engage in opportunistic  behavior. A 
firm is unlikely to make an investment if its buyers or suppliers can renege on 
agreements  after the investment is made.  The more specific the investment 
4.  An  interesting aside on the geographic concentration of the motion picture industry is that 
the three national officers of  the Screen Actors Guild, the president, treasurer, and secretary, must 
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(the fewer alternative uses it has), the greater is the danger of such behavior.s 
Geographic concentration can reduce the specificity of investments (or assets), 
since the presence  of  several local firms in an industry provides alternative 
transaction partners should one firm renege on its agreements.  Reduction of 
asset specificity greatly reduces the frequency of the potential holdup prob- 
lems that might force firms to integrate vertically. Geographic concentration 
also allows news of opportunistic behavior to spread rapidly through the indus- 
try, making it more difficult for the offending party to make further contracts, 
thereby increasing the costs of engaging in opportunistic behavior. Finally, lo- 
calized industries often develop additional governance structures, including so- 
cial as well as economic strictures, that lower the risk of opportunistic behavior 
and therefore the costs associated with market transactions.6 
The net result is that geographic concentration allows for the development 
of vertically disintegrated structures by allowing each activity to be performed 
at its optimal scale, reducing the transaction costs involved in market transac- 
tions,  and by  supplying  additional  mechanisms that  foster firm interdepen- 
dence. 
4.1.3  Incentive Structures in Localized Industries 
Markets and hierarchies each have advantages and disadvantages as mecha- 
nisms to coordinate transactions. The principal advantage of  markets lies in 
the clear incentives that they provide firms, whereas the principal disadvantage 
of markets lies in their inability to coordinate certain complex or difficult trans- 
actions. The principal advantage of hierarchies lies in their ability to coordinate 
complex or difficult transactions, whereas the principal disadvantages of hier- 
archies are problems of  incentives and bureaucracy,  such as principal-agent 
problems (the incentives of the principal and the agent might differ), needless 
intrusion by upper management, a tendency to forgive deficiencies within hier- 
archies (failure to hold individuals or groups responsible for outcomes reduces 
their incentive to give an optimal effort), and the politicization of investment 
and operating decisions (decisions are based on politics rather than economics) 
(Williamson  1985).  The disintegrated  structures common in many  localized 
industries allow market, or “high-powered,” incentives to permeate the system. 
Firms operating in each stage of the production process face local markets that 
force them to be efficient and to improve their skills and capabilities continu- 
ally. The structures can also increase overall industry efficiency by eliminating 
the incentive and bureaucratic features that limit the efficiency of hierarchical 
arrangements. In many instances, localized clusters of firms are able to obtain 
the benefits  of organization  through  markets, though  they can do so only if 
5. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian  (1978) link opportunism  with  specific assets. Williamson 
(1985) provides a complete treatment of the effect of specific assets on transactions. 
6.  dei Ottati (1987), for example, concludes that the sense of community present in Italy’s indus- 
trial districts helps govern transactions within the districts. Piore and Sahel (1984) identify “social 
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they develop coordination mechanisms that limit the disadvantages of the ab- 
sence of hierarchy. 
Other incentives also come into play in localized industries. In such indus- 
tries, interpersonal and interfirm rivalry can be particularly fierce. In an envi- 
ronment in which industry participants  know each other and the local press 
continually compares firms, the desire to be number one in the local industry 
becomes particularly acute. When Yamaha announced its intention to become 
the world leader in motorcycles, Honda moved quickly and decisively to meet 
the challenge  from its local  rival  (both firms were from Hamamatsu).’  The 
Sassuolo-area tile companies are owned by the leading citizens of the same 
town. Their place in the local pecking order is determined by the position and 
prestige  attained by their firms. The same is true in the Hollywood  motion 
picture industry, where a quick glance at the seating arrangements at leading 
restaurants shows the relative positions of  industry participants.* 
The economic literature on rank order tournaments indicates that this type of 
behavior may have adaptive value for localized industries. Rivalry for ordinal 
position (rivalry to outperform other participants rather than to achieve a par- 
ticular level of  performance),  or “playing to win,” can result in greater effi- 
ciency than other forms of  behavior when it is costly to monitor effort and 
common shocks (environmental factors that affect all participants and are be- 
yond their control) are relatively large. The basic argument is that when com- 
mon shocks are large, absolute performance levels depend more on the shock 
than the efforts or capabilities of  the participants. In these circumstances, re- 
wards based on absolute performance outcomes do not induce optimal levels 
of effort. Instead, rewards based on ordinal position can induce superior levels 
of effort on the part of participants.  In localized  industries,  where common 
shocks are large and monitoring, by those outside the firm, is costly, “playing 
to win” through investment in firm capabilities can increase the efficiency of 
the entire cluster of firms.9  Thus the constant comparison among firms and the 
interpersonal and interfirm rivalry found in localized industries can contribute 
to the efficiency and competitiveness of the local industry. 
Conversely, geographic concentration can also increase the level of coopera- 
tion among firms. Some forms of cooperation, such as bulk purchasing, joint 
7. The president of Yamaha was forced to publicly apologize for attempting to take over the 
number one spot. 
8. Several authors note that the interaction of economy and society within localized industries 
can lead to greater cooperation than would be observed among dispersed firms. The rationale is 
that economic  activity is embedded  in a larger set of  social relationships that foster trust and 
cooperation. Less attention has been paid to the idea that social interaction can be competitive as 
well as cooperative and that the competitive aspects may spill over into economic behavior. 
9. See Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green and Stokey 1983;  and Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983. In these 
papers, compensation  schemes that depend  on ordinal positions rather than absolute levels of 
output are shown to be superior (more efficient) when monitoring is costly and common shocks 
are large. As  the number of  participants increases, competition through investment in individual 
capabilities becomes more intense. Rewards based on ordinal positions provide the proper incen- 
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training programs, and industry-specific infrastructure investments, are often 
not possible when firms are dispersed. Localization can increase the political 
power of an industry, increasing the ability of its firms to lobby local authorities 
and giving it a greater voice in local affairs. Finally, the ease of communication 
within a geographically concentrated industry makes it easier to negotiate and 
monitor collusive agreements. If coordination is allowed to insulate firms from 
competitive pressures, however, incentives can become skewed, and the local- 
ized industry can lose its vitality. Coordination through collusion, by reducing 
competitive pressures, can actually reduce the pressure to coordinate produc- 
tive activities effectively. Again we see that geographic concentration does not 
determine industry behavior, but allows for a greater range of behavior than 
might otherwise be observed. 
4.2  Coordination of Productive Activities in Localized Industries 
In general, there are a number of mechanisms that can be employed to co- 
ordinate activity within an industry, including spot markets, short-term coali- 
tions, long-term relationships, and hierarchical organizations. The coordinat- 
ing  mechanisms  used  in  a  given  industry  will  depend  on  production 
technologies, the nature of demand, the competitive environment, firm strate- 
gies, and government regulation. They will often change over time. Each co- 
ordinating mechanism employs its own set of coordinating tools and coordinat- 
ing  agents  (see  fig.  4.1).  Prices  and  specifications  are  the  tools  used  to 
coordinate the activities of spot markets. Spot markets require marketmakers 
to match  supply with demand, or to take the place of  the auctioneer  of  the 
neoclassical economist.  Specific contracts  of limited duration typically bind 
the members of short-term coalitions. These coalitions usually require an orga- 
nizer or promoter to act as the coordinating agent. Economic or social inter- 
dependence, which is often formalized in general long-term contracts, serves 
to bind the members of long-term relationships. Usually, the members of such 
relationships are themselves the main coordinating agents. Finally, hierarchical 
organizations (firms) use compensation schemes to coordinate the activities of 
employees. The firms’ managers  are typically the main coordinating  agents. 
(All the papers in this volume address one or more of these aspects of coordi- 
nation.) 
Simply listing the  various organizational  forms and coordinating  mecha- 
nisms, however, does not tell us why a particular form or mechanism is used 
in a particular industry or situation. Only historical analysis of individual in- 
dustries and firms can provide such an understanding. The following examples 
describe the evolution of coordination between firms in some well-known lo- 
calized industries, each of which has seen dramatic change in organization and 
coordination in the twentieth century. Hollywood has been synonymous with 
the motion picture industry since the 1920s. Prato is perhaps the prototypical 
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Fig. 4.1  Types of coordination 
major success stories for centuries. The examples are not meant to provide a 
detailed explanation of why these industries are localized; I have done so else- 
where (Enright  1990). Instead, the examples take localization as a given and 
attempt to show the range of coordination mechanisms employed in localized 
industries and how these mechanisms have evolved in response to changes in 
products, technology, markets, competition, and government policies. 
4.2.1  Coordination through Short-Term Coalitions: The Hollywood Motion 
Picture Industry 
Hollywood, or more properly the Los Angeles area, has dominated the U.S. 
motion picture industry since the 1920s. In 1939, for example, Hollywood pro- 
duced 90 percent of  the feature-length motion pictures made in the United 
States and 65 percent of those produced in the world (Rosten  1970, 4). Ac- 
cording to the Department of Commerce’s census of service industries, in 1987 
California accounted for 75 percent of  U.S.  motion picture production  and 
70 percent of U.S. television show production. The Los Angeles-Long  Beach 
Primary Metropolitan  Statistical Area  (PMSA) accounted for 96 percent of 
California’s motion picture and 85 percent of its television show production in 
that year. This translated into 7 1 percent of the nation’s motion picture and 60 
percent of the nation’s television show production. 
Industry History 
Hollywood’s rise to prominence began shortly after the turn of the century. 
In  1909,  William  Selig,  a  Chicago  moviemaker  frustrated  by  Chicago’s 
weather (all movies were shot outdoors at the time) and running battles with 
the New York-based  Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC),’O moved his 
10. The MPPC was created  in  1908 to  pool and control the various patents that had  been 
awarded on motion pictures and motion picture equipment. The trust sought to enforce its monop- 
oly on motion picture production through the courts and through strong-arm tactics. The U.S. 
Justice Department eventually sued the MPPC for antitrust violations. The MPPC was dissolved 
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business to Los Angeles. Another company, the Nestor Film Corporation, set 
up the first studio in Hollywood in  1910. Within three months, there were fif- 
teen  companies  shooting films in Hollywood, which was soon transformed 
from a sleepy  residential community  into the  motion  picture  capital of  the 
world.  The movie  companies  were  initially  attracted  to  Hollywood  by  the 
weather,  the  proximity  of  Los Angeles  (which  provided  infrastructure  and 
workers), location near other film companies (which stimulated the develop- 
ment  of  specialized  services and  suppliers for the  industry),  and  low  land 
prices.  Another  attraction  was  distance  from New  York  (and  the  MPPC’s 
strong-arm tactics) and proximity to Mexico (which permitted escape beyond 
the jurisdiction of U.S. marshals). The physical geography of the Los Angeles 
area allowed film companies to find a wide range of locations, including moun- 
tains, deserts, rivers, and ocean, within a day’s journey. According to Schatz 
(1983, 33,  the forces that were to become the major Hollywood studios were 
in place by  1914. By  1915, the local  film industry payroll was already esti- 
mated at $15 million (Palmer 1938, 191, 198). 
During the “studio era” (mid-1920s to  1949), the U.S. motion picture in- 
dustry  was  controlled  by  eight  corporations.  The  five  so-called  majors, 
Paramount,  Loew’s, Twentieth  Century-Fox,  Warner  Brothers,  and  Radio- 
Keith-Orpheum  (RKO), were  fully  integrated  into production,  distribution, 
and exhibition. Of the  “little  three,” Universal  and  Columbia produced  and 
distributed films but  owned  no theaters,  whereas United Artists distributed 
films for independent producers but did no production and owned no theaters. 
The majors developed strategies based on creating stars, controlling distribu- 
tion, and dominating exhibition through ownership of a small number of first- 
run theaters. This strategy allowed the majors to receive roughly 75 percent of 
the motion picture rental fees during the studio era. The “little three” received 
around 20 percent of  the film rentals  in the studio era; all other companies 
combined received around 5 percent.I’ 
Coordination of the industry’s activities was carried out within the vertically 
integrated firms. The majors’ overall production and release schedules were 
set by corporate management in New York. The Hollywood studio chief and a 
small number of producers then organized the writing, pre-production work, 
filming, editing, and post-production work using actors, staff writers, directors, 
and crews, as well as pre- and post-production workers who were under long- 
term contracts (the so-called contract system). The studios attempted to utilize 
fully their fixed production assets to supply their other, larger fixed assets in 
exhibition and distribution.’* Specialized skills and rigid union work rules (by 
the mid- to late  1930s) meant that a large number of  individuals performed 
I  I. Although the majors dominated motion picture production during the studio era, some inde- 
pendent producers, such as Samuel Goldwyn and David 0. Selznick, producer of  Gone with the 
Wind, were able to make their way during the period. 
12. According to Gomery 1986.8, production accounted for only 5 percent of the major studios’ 
assets in the 1940s. Distribution accounted for 1 percent and exhibition (theaters) 94 percent. 113  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
sharply defined specialized tasks for a given film (Gomery 1986, 15). Holly- 
wood and New York negotiated over budgets, schedules, wages, and invest- 
ments. Final decisions usually rested with the CEO in New York, not the studio 
boss in Hollywood. The physical separation of management allowed the pro- 
duction chief to be part of the Hollywood creative milieu while corporate re- 
mained part of the New York financial and distribution community. The separa- 
tion  also  allowed  the  studio  chief  a  certain  autonomy,  providing  some 
insulation from the very different tasks of distribution and exhibition. 
Under the studio system, motion picture production in Hollywood became 
a standardized process tightly controlled and coordinated by the studio boss. 
Many believe the mass production of motion pictures reached its zenith (or 
nadir) at MGM, under Louis B. Mayer, and Warner Brothers, under Jack War- 
ner, in the 1930s and 1940s. Mayer, MGM studio boss from 1924 to 1947, was 
reportedly the highest-paid  executive in the United  States in the  1930s. At 
MGM, producers could only sign stars and initiate projects with Mayer’s ex- 
press approval. Warner Brothers was particularly known for its assembly-line 
methods of  moviemaking. Jack Warner and his assistants made all the im- 
portant movie production decisions, generally trying to produce large volumes 
of films on small budgets, reusing stories, and operating with an overworked 
and underpaid studio staff (Gomery 1986,68-69,  112-15). 
An antitrust suit initiated by the Justice Department against the eight largest 
motion picture companies in 1938 had a dramatic impact on the movie indus- 
try. In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the companies had illegally 
monopolized the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures.13 In what be- 
came known as. the “Paramount Decision,” the Court ordered the firms to divest 
their theaters and outlawed block booking, the practice of forcing exhibitors to 
take blocks of films, sight unseen, in order to obtain any films at all. The deci- 
sion influenced organization and coordination in the motion picture industry 
in two ways. The direct effect was the separation of exhibition from distribu- 
tion. The indirect effect was the separation of distribution and production. The 
divestiture of the theaters and the end of block booking meant that each film 
had to be marketed individually. A studio could no longer guarantee the run of 
its motion pictures, or whether they would actually be run at all. Faced with 
greatly increased uncertainty, the Paramount defendants curtailed production 
(even though the Paramount decision did not force them to do so), further 
decreasing their level of  vertical integration, and ended the contract system. 
Directors, writers, producers, and performers began to freelance on a picture- 
by-picture basis, while the “studios” focused on distribution rather than pro- 
duction.14 
Another result was a dramatic increase in the importance of independent 
13. Charges of monopolization of production were dismissed. 
14.  I  will  continue to  use  the  tern “studio” (following industry  practice)  to  refer  to  the 
productioddistribution companies. 114  Michael J. Enright 
production. In 1949, independently produced films accounted for only 20 per- 
cent of the films released by the eight Paramount defendants. United Artists, 
which did not produce at all, accounted for half of  that 20 percent. In  1957, 
independent production accounted for 58 percent of  the large distributors’ re- 
leases, with United Artists releasing less than one-third of that 58 percent (Co- 
nant  1978, 117-18).  The separation of production from distribution had unan- 
ticipated benefits. The major studios found that independent producers were 
able to provide films that  were more creative and lower cost than  in-house 
production, with its large overhead expenses and risk-averse formula-film tra- 
dition, indicating that there had been significant inefficiencies in the vertically 
integrated  structure. The studios actually  accelerated  the process of  vertical 
disintegration by renting studio space, distributing independent films, and in- 
vesting in independent  production.  Warner Brothers, for example, advanced 
$1.6 million to independent producers in 1946. Ten years later the figure was 
$25.1 mi1li0n.l~ 
Actually, the motion picture industry had begun to change even before the 
Paramount decision. During the boom years of the Second World War, leading 
stars, directors, and producers set up production companies to take advantage 
of favorable corporate and capital gains tax  rates.I6 By the  1950s, most im- 
portant  stars  had  formed  their  own  production  companies (Gomery  1986, 
9-10).  Bitter but  successful unionization  drives in the  1930s and  1940s left 
Hollywood  a fully  unionized  shop by  the time  of  the  Paramount  decision. 
Extremely  detailed  work  rules  limited  the  flexibility  of  the  studios,  while 
wage agreements increased the integrated studios’ labor expenses. Even before 
the decision, studios had begun efforts to reduce their fixed costs and payrolls. 
Paradoxically, industry-wide union contracts, which gave workers protection 
without the need to negotiate a detailed agreement for each film, and the roster 
system, in which the craft unions acted as hiring halls to allocate temporary 
jobs, allowed independent filmmakers to find qualified personnel without in- 
curring search and negotiation costs. After the Paramount decision, more and 
more filmmakers found they could increase flexibility and decrease expenses 
by hiring independent contractors rather than permanent employees. The result 
was a further “casualization”  (use of temporary workers and contractors)  of 
motion picture employment.17 
The structure of the motion picture industry was also influenced by changes 
in demand due to demographic changes and increased competition from televi- 
sion. As population  shifted from city to suburb, it became more difficult  to 
attract crowds to the large inner-city  theaters that had provided  the bulk of 
15. Warner Brothers Annual Reports, quoted in Conant 1978, 117. 
16. Some artists were able to reduce their effective tax rates from 81 percent to 60 percent by 
incorporating. Others were able to sell interests in motion pictures as assets and therefore qualify 
for the 25 percent capital gains rate in effect at the time. 
17. This process has continued to the present. See Christopherson and Storper 1989; and Storper 
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movie revenues in the 1930s and 1940s. A more important phenomenon was 
the advent of television. In 1949, there were 1 million sets in use in the United 
States: by 1969. there were 84 million. The penetration of television went from 
2.3 percent of American households to 95 percent of households over the pe- 
riod. By 1960, the average American was watching twenty-five hours of televi- 
sion a week (Schatz 1983, 18).  U.S. motion picture admissions  peaked in 1946 
and fell dramatically until levelling off in the mid- 1960s at less than one-third 
of the peak. Competition from television forced motion picture producers to 
find ways to differentiate  their films. One result  was an increased  focus on 
large-budget, star-studded blockbuster (and would-be blockbuster) films. The 
focus on blockbusters was reflected in the growth in average movie production, 
or  negative,  costs.  During  the  studio  period,  production  costs  averaged 
$500,000  per movie. By 1952, the figure was $1 million. By 1970, it was $1.5 
million. Costs rose dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. The average produc- 
tion cost was $9.4 million in 1980, and by  1992, it cost between $40 million 
and $50 million to make, distribute,  and advertise a major motion picture.I8 
The rise of the blockbuster resulted in increased volatility in the industry. The 
success  of  a  studio could  now  depend  on  the results  of  a  single motion 
picture.19 
Increased volatility led to the evolution of a variety of organizational forms 
that developed to manage or  share the risks involved in motion picture produc- 
tion. The three principal organizational forms used for motion picture produc- 
tion  in  the  early  1990s reflected  this  evolution.  Nine  major studioszo still 
engaged in in-house production (vertical integration of production and distri- 
bution), where the studio financed the movie internally; hired producers, direc- 
tors, and actors (usually  to a one-picture contract); and then distributed  the 
film through its distribution arm.21  A second organizational form was the fully 
independent  production  company  in  which  an  independent producer  (there 
were literally hundreds in the industry) financed and made the picture and then 
attempted to sell the film to a major studio that would distribute it, in what was 
known as a “negative pickup deal”  (an arm’s-length transaction on what was 
essentially a spot market).z2  A third form was independent production with a 
studio guarantee,  in  which  the  independent producer put  together  a script, 
18. See The Motion Picfure Almanac, several years. Much of the increase was attributable to a 
dramatic increase in fees commanded by  Hollywood’s leading stars. The wages of the director, 
writer, producer, and stars accounted for roughly 10  percent of the typical film’s budget in 1982, 
but 50 percent in 1992 (Stein 1992). 
19. Cleoputru (1963), which lost some $18 million, nearly drove Fox into bankruptcy. Two years 
later The Sound of  Music,  which grossed more than  $75 million, became the most successful 
motion picture ever released to that point. E.T (1982) cost $12 million to make and grossed more 
than  $228 million in revenues. Ishtar (19871, on the other hand, cost $45 million to make and 
grossed only $7.5 million. 
20. Buena Vista (owned by  Disney), Columbia (owned by  Sony), MGMAJA (owned by Credit 
Lyonnais), Orion, Paramount, TriStar, Tbentieth Century-Fox (owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation), Universal (owned by Matsushita), and Warner Brothers (owned by Time-Warner). 
21. Paramount presently makes most of its pictures in this way. 
22. Producer Saul Zantz financed Amadeus, which he then sold to the highest bidder. 116  Michael J. Enright 
actors, director, and crew and then sold the idea to a major studio, which guar- 
anteed that it would buy the film as long as it met certain requirements  (an 
intermediate form of coordination). The producer then took this guarantee to 
a bank that extended a loan to cover production  costs.Z3  Variations on these 
organizational  forms included  coproduction, in which  two or more  studios 
shared production  responsibilitie~,~~  and cofinancing, where studios took  on 
outside financial partners (often foreign distributors) for films they produced 
in-house. Another variation was affiliated production, which involved coopera- 
tion between a studio and a large entertainment/production company to pro- 
duce a feature film.2’ 
Negative pickup deals increased  in importance in the late  1980s. In  1987 
and  1988, the major distributors  picked up more than half  of the films they 
distributed (see table 4.1). This trend was somewhat reversed in the 1990s, as 
many independents faced financial difficulties or bankruptcy.26  The late 1980s 
and early 1990s also saw an increase in multipicture deals, in which the Holly- 
wood studios signed exclusive contracts with leading stars and filmmakers for 
a fixed number of films. Multipicture deals provided filmmakers and stars with 
financial security, while giving the studios the chance to lock up proven mon- 
eymakers for several pictures in medium-term relationships. Multipicture deals 
tended to be risky for the studio, since they gambled on the continued popular- 
ity and creativity of the artist~.~’  Some of the more noteworthy multipicture 
deals involved Paramount  and Eddie Murphy, Orion and Woody  Allen, and 
Twentieth Century-Fox  and writer-director James Cameron (of Terminator 2 
fame).2R  Industry sources estimated this last deal, reached in April  1992 and 
covering up to twelve pictures, could be worth $500 million (Eller and Fleming 
1992). Multipicture deals linked individual artists with the studio. A new short- 
term coalition still had to be put together for each individual film. 
Coordination within the Hollywood Motion Picture Industry 
Coordination  mechanisms in the Hollywood  motion picture industry have 
evolved to meet changes in the regulatory and economic environment. In the 
23. Spike Lee has made all his films in this way. 
24. The latter is rare, but does occur. Warner Brothers and Universal coproduced Gorillas in the 
Mist, a film for which both owned production rights. 
25. There were several large entertainment/production companies, including Amblin Entertain- 
ment (owned by Stephen Spielberg) and Ma1 Passo (owned by Clint Eastwood). Such companies 
often worked with different studios on different films. 
26. Independent production has been a difficult business. Roughly 40 to 50 percent of the inde- 
pendent productions produced in  the early 1980s in the United States never received U.S. theatri- 
cal distribution. See Cohn 199  I. 
27. Most multipicture deals involved either cofinancing (the producer’s own company agreed to 
raise part of the cost of making the movie, the studio agreed to pick up the rcst) or equity participa- 
tion (in which the artist would be paid a percentage of  the gross or a portion of the profits of the 
films) to make sure that the interests of the studios and the artists coincided. 
28. Murphy’s  1991 agreement guaranteed him $12 million a film for four films. See Wechsler 
1990; Landro 1991; and Weinraub  1991b. Allen made nine pictures for Orion between 1982 and 
1991 and  was committed for three more until  Orion’s  financial difficulties left them  unable  to 
finance Allen’s projects. See Weinraub  1991a. 117  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
Table 4.1  In-House Production versus Acquisitions for the 
Major Film Distributors 
In-House  Acquired  Percentage 













































Source: Variew, 27 April 1992. 
Notes: English-language films distributed by the major distributors in the United States. Compa- 
nies covered are Buena Vista, Columbia, MGMAJA, Orion, Paramount, TriStar, Twentieth Cen- 
tury-Fox,  Universal, Warner Brothers, Triumph, and Sony Pictures Classics. 
"Year of  commencement of production. 
hFirst half of year. 
studio era, the studio bosses and their assistants coordinated the actual making 
of motion pictures in extremely hierarchical structures. The large motion pic- 
ture companies  used personal  negotiations between  a studio chief  based  in 
California with corporate management in New York to coordinate production 
with distribution and exhibition. Individual films were placed under the control 
of a producer, generally a studio employee who organized film production at 
the behest of the studio boss. The Paramount case had a dramatic influence on 
the industry structure and coordination mechanisms within the industry. The 
separation of production and distribution from exhibition made the integration 
of production and distribution far less attractive than it had been. Changes in 
industry economics associated with competition from television, unionization, 
changing demographics, and changes in the bargaining power of the various 
parties also contributed to the disintegration of the industry. In fact, it is highly 
unlikely that the vertically integrated studio system would have survived these 
developments even in the absence of the Paramount decision. 
In the modern industry, studio projects, studio-backed independent projects, 
and negative pickup deals provide coordination through hierarchy. quasi mar- 
kets, and spot markets  respectively. Although  the precise organization may 
differ, in each case an individual film is created through the efforts of a short- 
term coalition. The minimum efficient scale for movie production is the single 
production unit or single project. Project-based coalitions of directors, actors, 
crew, contractors, and subcontractors are assembled  for each major motion 
picture (see fig. 4.2). Virtually every credit for a major motion picture repre- 
sents an independent entity contracted to work on the film. Large numbers of 118  Michael J. Enright 
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contracts must be written for each motion picture. Even the studios’ in-house 
production  involves the hiring of  many  individuals  and subcontractors  on a 
one-film basis. The costs of casting, negotiations, agents’ and lawyers’ fees, 
and monitoring can account for a substantial portion of the costs of a film.29 
The many agreements and contracts necessary to produce a motion picture 
involve a huge amount of communication and an array of coordinating agents. 
Localization is vital for an industry whose participants are in constant commu- 
nication. One industry executive estimated that he spent fifty hours a week on 
the phone, with roughly 80 percent  of the time spent on local phone calls. 
Another executive stated, “In this business, it’s all based on who you know- 
and you have to network-the  agents are here and so are the writers. Everyone 
knows everyone. These people live, eat, and breathe the entertainment indus- 
try.” In order to participate in the industry, one has to be part of the local sub- 
29. Agents typically receive 10 percent of the fees paid to actors and directors; lawyers typically 
receive another 5 percent. Completion guarantee insurance once cost on the order of 5 percent of 
a movie’s budget, but by  1992 cost around  1.5 percent of  the production budget (Scholl  1992). 
The costs associated with negotiating the contracts and monitoring the production were at least  10 
percent of the production budget for a typical movie in  1992. This was in addition to the search 
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culture. Formal and informal networks have developed among the studios, di- 
rectors, and local firms in the area. The motion picture community is relatively 
small; there are only a few dozen key decision makers. Since information flows 
so quickly and completely through the industry, a reputation for fair dealing is 
essential, and opportunistic behavior is often swiftly punished. 
A  bewildering  number  of  intermediaries  have  emerged  as coordinating 
agents within the industry. Producers, executive producers, talent agents, enter- 
tainment  lawyers,  and business  affairs executives negotiate the multitude of 
deals that must be made for each motion picture, effectively matching supply 
and demand and setting prices for the services of film artists. The producer is 
usually the one who puts, and keeps, together the coalition required  for the 
project. Today, a producer might be an independent filmmaker, a studio execu- 
tive, a talent agent, a friend of a major star, or anyone who has access to a good 
story, a top director, a major studio, or a popular artist. The larger talent agen- 
cies have used their control over access to many top-name clients to become 
major forces in the industry.3n  The agencies keep constant track of ongoing and 
prospective deals and movies and are generally well informed about similar 
deals made in the recent past.  Business  affairs executives deal with artists, 
negotiate for distribution rights for finished films, and negotiate studio partici- 
pation in the development and financing of in-house and independent produc- 
tions on behalf of the studios. Business affairs executives frequently share in- 
formation  with  their  counterparts at  other studios  on  a  confidential  basis 
(Brouwer and Wright 1990,57). Information sharing on both sides has created 
a remarkably efficient market for motion picture talent in Hollywood. 
Interfirm and interpersonal  competition is a driving force in the industry. 
The studios compete fiercely with one another to attract talented individuals 
and promising projects, and to place their films at the most desirable theaters. 
Rivalry in the motion picture industry is highly personal. According to Rosten 
(1 970), under the old studio system, battles between studio bosses often got in 
the way  of potentially  lucrative deals. Today, interpersonal  rivalry is still in- 
tense, especially  since each individual is constantly trying to find his or her 
next job and since each individual is considered only as good as the last film he 
or she was involved in. The local trade press heightens the rivalry by constantly 
comparing the performance of  the  movie  companies, as well  as individual 
actors, directors, and producers. The movie hierarchy is apparent for all in the 
industry to see. As was noted earlier, the seating arrangements at Spago's and 
other local restaurants reflect the fortunes of industry participants on an almost 
daily basis. 
The disintegration of the studio system, which increased the number of face- 
to-face negotiations required to make a picture, actually resulted in an increase 
of geographic concentration in the industry. Christopherson and Storper (1986) 
30. Michael Ovitz of Creative Artists Agency (CAA) is generally regarded as the most powerful 
individual in Hollywood. 120  Michael J. Enright 
measured a substantial increase in the number of firms in filmmaking services 
in the Los Angeles area. Given the stability of output of films during the period 
(1966-82),  they conclude there was a substantial increase in vertical disinte- 
gration in the industry. Industry sources indicated that the trend was reversing 
only slightly in the 1990s as the complexity of some pre- and post-production 
activities (including some technically sophisticated special effects) caused the 
studios to bring them in-house. Even so, the number of specialized firms that 
serve the motion picture industry has grown dramatically in the Los Angeles 
area. Hollywood remains unparalleled in the availability of services (including 
casting and monitoring to ensure productions come in on time and on budget), 
contractors, subcontractors, state-of-the-art facilities, talent, and skilled craft 
workers for the motion picture industry. One can easily contract for services 
that a production company operating elsewhere would have to perform for it- 
self. Formal and informal networks have developed among the studios, direc- 
tors, and local firms in the area. These networks, combined with the contacts 
and reputations of  individuals and the use of facilitators such as agents and 
lawyers. allow coordination within the motion picture industry through short- 
term coalitions. 
4.2.2  Coordination by Entrepreneurs and Markets: The Prato 
Wool Textile Industry 
Italy  is by  far the world’s leading exporter of  wool textiles.  In  1989, for 
example, Italy accounted for 39 percent of world exports of wool fabrics and 
46 percent of world exports of fine wool (United Nations  1991). The Italian 
industry  is centered in three areas; the Prato area in Tuscany, the Piedmont 
town of Biella, and the Veneto region. Today, Prato, which is just outside of 
Florence, accounts for roughly 50 percent of  Italian wool textile production, 
Biella 30 percent, and the Veneto region around 15 percent to 20 percent (Ital- 
ian Wool Industry Association, private communication). The industry is even 
more localized than these figures suggest. Biella firms specialize in top-quality 
fabrics  for  men’s  clothing,  whereas  Prato  firms  generally  supply  medium- 
quality  fabrics  for  women’s  wear.  Prato  firms  account  for  roughly  three- 
quarters of the medium-quality wool fabric produced in Italy. 
Industry History 
The Prato wool textile industry dates back at least to the early twelfth cen- 
tury. Local records document the operation of a fulling mill in Prato as early 
as 1108. Later in the twelfth century, the Bisenzio River was channeled through 
the city to serve local fulling mills and dyeing establishments. Prato authorities 
encouraged development of the textile industry by exempting from local taxes 
wool workers and dyers who had relocated  from Verona and Lombardy. Al- 
though the different stages of textile production3’ in Prato had once been char- 
3 1. The principal stages in wool fabric production were and are raw material preparation, spin- 
ning, weaving, dyeing, and finishing. 121  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
acterized by independent craftsmen selling on open markets, by the fourteenth 
century, capitalist  wool  merchants  (lunuiuolo) controlled  the  industry. The 
Prato merchants imported raw materials from Spain, Africa, and, for the finest 
fabrics, England, subcontracted production, and then sold the finished fabric 
in local and foreign markets (Origo 1986, 46-47).  Individual firms that sup- 
plied the merchants were organized and coordinated under the umbrella of the 
local cloth guild (Arte della Lana), which dominated the various stages of tex- 
tile production and sales (Origo  1986, 36). Four consuls named by  the city 
council settled quarrels between  guild members  and enforced  guild regula- 
tions. Cloth sales were strictly controlled by  guild statutes, which governed 
even the selection of  a supplier for a given customer (Origo  1986, 45). Al- 
though the guild system eventually dissolved, the industry retained a structure 
in which merchants coordinated activities within the industry, subcontracting 
production to homeworkers  and  independent  craftsmen, for more than  four 
centuries. 
A modern, mechanized textile industry began to develop in Prato in the mid- 
nineteenth century. Shortly after the industrial revolution began in the United 
Kingdom, textile technology and machinery began to find their way  to Prato. 
Giovanni Mazzoni, a graduate of the University of Pisa, combined his theoreti- 
cal knowledge with the practical experience he gained in French cotton mills 
to open his  own  cotton-spinning  facility  in  Prato  in  1819. Mazzoni,  who 
switched over to wool production in  1823-24,  is credited with bringing the 
latest textile developments of  the time to Prato (Lugonelli  1988, 8). Pratesi 
soon left farming in large numbers to enter the textile industry. The local share- 
cropping system, which operated through a series of  subcontracting relation- 
ships, had helped generate a population of independent,  self-reliant artisans 
who readily took up the textile trades. By 1846, the textile industry accounted 
for more than 90 percent of industrial employment in the area (Tenti 1987). 
By  1862, there were twenty-seven factories in the Prato textile industry. In 
1878, after a difficult period for the industry, there  were twenty-eight wool 
textile firms with  more than ten employees in the area. Prato had become a 
leader in recycled wool (wool made from rags and scraps) and was the leading 
center for the collection, sorting, and distribution of rags in Europe. Protection- 
ist tariffs instituted in 1887 had a profound effect on the Prato industry, increas- 
ing demand for Prato’s fabrics and fostering the development of new factories. 
The  most  important  of  the  new  facilities  was  the  Kossler-Mayer  factory, 
founded in  1888. This factory, which was owned by Austrians and employed 
Germans and Czechs in technical positions, was huge by Prato standards, em- 
ploying 900 workers and 640 mechanical looms (Lugonelli 1988,33). Over the 
next several years, this and other factories grew up alongside more traditional 
handicraft production. 
Mechanization was accompanied by the rise of vertically integrated textile 
mills, mills that performed all or nearly all textile production steps internally. 
By the end of the  1920s, approximately 80 percent of the Prato area’s twenty 
thousand textile workers were employed by vertically integrated mills (Trigilia 122  Michael J. Enright 
1989). The industry further consolidated in the 1930s and 1940s due to large 
military  and a focus on long production runs of standard fabrics, which 
were exported to less developed countries, particularly India and South Africa. 
At the time, the industry’s requirements for coordination with the outside world 
were limited. Raw materials were  imported from Australia  through  British 
traders. Because their fabrics were not differentiated, the Prato firms did not 
need to develop sophisticated marketing capabilities. Instead, British interme- 
diaries organized the important trade of commodity fabrics to British colonies 
(including  India  and  South  Africa).  Coordination  of  productive  activities 
within the Prato industry was carried out by owners and managers within the 
relatively large, vertically integrated firms that continued to dominate the local 
industry until after the Second World War. Throughout this period, the Prato- 
area textile industry remained much smaller than that of Biella, which concen- 
trated on higher-quality wool fabrics. 
A boom in the Prato industry created by  United Nations relief operations 
and  the  rebuilding  of  Europe  in  the  immediate  post-World  War  11  period 
proved to be short-lived  (dei Ottati  1991b). In  the early  1950s, competition 
from low-cost producers in Third World nations, reduced military demand, the 
recession of the early 1950s, and increased protection in India and South Af- 
rica (which instituted import substitution programs shortly after obtaining their 
independence)  resulted  in  a crisis for the  Prato textile industry. Collapsing 
wool prices (which fell by 6.5 percent between March and September 195  1 [dei 
Ottati 1991bl) put further pressure on the textile firms, which saw the value of 
their stocks drop precipitously.  In  response to the crisis, the vertically  inte- 
grated Prato firms closed their factories, dismissed their workers, and sold their 
machinery to former employees who went into business for themselves. The 
result was the disintegration of the industry and the founding of a large number 
of small specialized firms out of the remnants of the vertically integrated mills. 
Subcontracting of individual steps in the production process became the princi- 
pal means of regulating relations among an increasing number of ever-smaller 
firms (Lorenzoni 198.5). This division of labor was possible because the stages 
of  wool  textile production  are separable and the  technology relatively  well 
known and mature. The number of Prato-area textile firms increased from 780 
in  1951 to 14,500 in  1981 and to  15,000 in  1990. The average firm size de- 
creased  from twenty-eight  employees to less than  four employees  over the 
same period (Balestri 1990; industry sources). 
The vertical disintegration of the Prato-area textile industry was accompa- 
nied, and in part caused, by changes in product mix. In the pre-World  War  I1 
era, Prato firms tended to supply long runs of standard fabrics. After the war, 
the Prato industry shifted to more differentiated production, both in the fabrics 
themselves and the timing of the production cycle. Prato’s skilled workers be- 
came masters at the flexible, rapid-turnaround,  short production  runs needed 
32. The Italian government preferred to deal with a few firms for large military orders. 123  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
for fashion apparel and prototypes of mass market apparel. Modem technology 
and machinery (mostly supplied by local machinery firms) and the short pro- 
duction runs required  for fashion  apparel allowed for efficient  operation at 
small scale. Fragmentation led to an increase in variety, which, along with the 
geographic concentration of the industry, reduced shopping costs for custom- 
ers and  attracted  buyers  from  around  the  world.  According  to  Lorenzoni 
(1985), potential clients knew that in Prato they could find firms willing and 
able to produce virtually any fabric design. Design capabilities became key to 
the Prato industry. By the late 1980s, Prato firms introduced some 25,000 new 
designs and 60,000 new patterns every six months, as older patterns were cop- 
ied and produced more cheaply elsewhere. The development of new patterns 
and the actual production of swatches of  new designs were among the most 
important and costly  activities of  the  Prato firms, many of  which  spent an 
amount equal to approximately 10 percent of sales on their pattern books. 
The disintegration of the textile industry was further encouraged by attitudes 
toward entrepreneurship that developed within the Prato area. Owning a firm 
and being one’s own boss became a nearly universal goal, fueled in part by the 
example  of  successful  entrepreneurs.  Workers,  technicians,  and  managers 
acted on the widespread desire for independence found in the area (Mazzonis 
1985,7). Disintegration was also encouraged, unwittingly, by government poli- 
cies. Italy’s artisan industry laws provided  support for the purchase of new 
equipment by small firms, while labor legislation passed in the 1970s contrib- 
uted to the fragmentation of the industry by making it difficult to operate larger 
firms. Restrictions on hiring and firing, indexed wages, and tight work rules hit 
the cyclical textile industry particularly hard. Small firms, which were exempt 
from some of the more onerous provisions of the labor laws, proved to be more 
flexible.33  ENEA, Italy’s agency  for atomic  and  alternative  energy  sources, 
concluded that Italian labor legislation that limits the freedom to hire and fire 
workers in firms with fifteen or more employees discouraged the growth and 
limited the vertical integration of Prato textile firms. This, in turn, contributed 
to the flexibility and adaptability of the system as a whole (ENEA 1985, 1). 
By  1990, the Prato-area wool textile industry consisted of nearly  15,000 
firms employing 57,000 people.34  The latter figure represented more than 50 
percent of the area’s employment and over one-sixth of its population. Small 
firms, with fewer than  ten employees,  accounted for 40 percent of  industry 
employment. Firms with fewer than fifty employees accounted for some 80 
percent industry employment (see table 4.2).  One out of  every twenty  local 
residents owned a textile firm (Unione Industriele Pratese  1991). Most Prato 
firms specialized in a single stage of production. A single batch of raw material 
often passed through five, six, or more Prato firms on its path from raw material 
33. There was a reduction in the average firm  size across the Italian manufacturing sector in the 
34. The second-largest employer in the area was the textile machinery industry, which employed 
1970s and into the 1980s. 
approximately ten thousand people. 124  Michael J. Enright 
Table 4.2  Employment in the Prato Textile Industry, by  Firm Size, 1990 











Source: Calculated from information provided by the Unione Industriele Pratese. 
“Estimated. 
to finished textile. There were no firms that engaged in all production  stages. 
Nonetheless, the Prato textile industry, and the Italian wool textile industry as 
a whole, has dramatically outperformed the industries in the rest of Europe, 
which were not as localized or fragmented. 
Coordination within the Prato Textile Industry 
Coordination within the Prato textile industry has been influenced  by  the 
requirements of the product and its production process. In textile production, 
the  same  material  is  processed  through  several  consecutive  and  separable 
stages. Coordination of production involves arranging and guiding the flow of 
material through and between these stages. 
The mechanisms used to coordinate activities within the Prato-area textile 
industry have evolved in response to changes in the competitive environment, 
technology, and product market strategies. In the Middle Ages, the industry 
was coordinated  by  guild statutes that regulated almost every  aspect of  the 
relationships  within  the  industry  and  between  the industry  and  the  outside 
world. The wool merchants coordinated the import of raw materials, organized 
production, and had the exclusive right to market finished product to local and 
foreign customers. Though the guilds eventually dissolved, merchants contin- 
ued to coordinate the production of numerous craftsmen for centuries. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, industrial entrepreneurs and factory 
owners coordinated the bulk of Prato’s productive activities, while British mer- 
chants coordinated sales to some of Prato’s major markets. 
The fragmented industry structure that developed in the post-World  War I1 
period required different skills, such as marketing, creativity  in design, and 
capacity to serve new markets. The relatively high quality and rapid turnaround 
that  became  the  norm  in  the  Prato  textile  industry  involved  a  substantial 
amount of coordination and communication  to mesh productive  stages. The 
localization of the industry facilitated the organization of  a complex system 
where  each  stage  of  production  delivered  just-in-time  to  each  subsequent 
stage. The disintegrated structure and the size of the local industry also led (as 
Stigler [1951] and Evans [1972] might suggest) to the development of a large 
number of firms who provided services to the textile industry, a fact that further 125  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
increased the importance of efficient flow of financial, organizational,  com- 
mercial, and technical information within the district (Mazzonis 1985,4). Bra- 
bant  (1985) estimated  that communication  costs (including  the value of the 
time used in communicating) in the Prato textile district was approximately 
2.9 percent of total sales, or on the order of $70 million to $80 million each 
year. In comparison, sample production, one of the most important activities 
in the industry, often represented 10  percent of a company’s sales. Of all textile- 
related communication originating in Prato, 54 percent was directed to others 
in the area, 34 percent was directed to the rest of Italy, and 12 percent was 
directed  abroad. The vast majority of the communication within  Prato took 
place over the telephone or in face-to-face meetings. 
Information flows within the Prato industry have benefited from its localiza- 
tion. Virtually everyone in the Prato area is involved in the textile industry in 
some capacity. The industry is literally “in the air.” Everyone speaks the same 
language, literally and figuratively. Social contacts and interpersonal networks 
help spread  information about the industry  and its firms. Standardized con- 
tracts,  which  reduce  the information  requirements  for any  particular  trans- 
action, have emerged. Recognizing the importance of information flow within 
the district, local and national authorities have cooperated in a program to de- 
velop  advanced  information  systems  and computerized ordering.  Many  in 
Prato, however, believe that information flows so freely through the area that 
local governmental efforts to install advanced information systems have been 
superfluous, and the efforts have been ignored by many Prato firms. 
Today, most transactions in the Prato industry take place on spot markets. 
Coordination is achieved through contractual relationships and market parame- 
ters such as price, quality, timing, and reliability, rather than hierarchical au- 
thority (Lorenzoni  1985, 12). Impannutori have become the central coordinat- 
ing agents of the Prato industry. Impannatori have occupied a unique position 
in the industry, supervising fabric design, finding clients, purchasing material, 
subcontracting production, coordinating logistics, and making final sales, often 
without directly controlling any production capacity.3s  Though impannatori ex- 
isted in the pre-World  War I1 industry, their importance grew dramatically in 
the postwar era with the need to coordinate the production of the new, frag- 
mented firms. After receiving orders, impannatori subcontract productive ac- 
tivities on a spot basis. They tend to use many subcontractors, and each sub- 
contractor tends to serve many customers, with the local market providing the 
principal coordination mechanism for firm activities. Most impannatori rotate 
their subcontractors  periodically. Those that do not  still use the presence  of 
numerous local competitors and common knowledge of local quality and price 
standards  to  set  contract  parameters.  This  results  in  essentially  market- 
mediated  outcomes, even for what appear to be long-term relationships.  As 
long as a subcontractor does not deviate from local standards of quality, or try 
35. The only physical assets employed by many impannaton are their telephones. 126  Michael J. Enright 
to charge above the going price for a service, there is no reason to change 
subcontractors. 
By  1990, there were approximately  six hundred  impannatori active in the 
Prato area. The impannatori have become the marketmakers of  the Prato sys- 
tem, matching supply within the Prato area with demand, from Italy and from 
abroad. According to Becattini (1990,42-43),  the impannatori are “pure entre- 
preneurs” whose major function is to translate the capabilities  of the district 
into products that can be sold on world markets. The impannatori coordinate 
activities within the district. They also coordinate the activities of  the district 
with the outside  world, obtaining  information  on improved machinery,  new 
processes, and markets wherever it is available. As a result, the Prato system 
has been able to keep abreast of  the most modem technology as it competes 
on the basis of quality, design, reliability, continuity of supplies, and punctual 
delivery (Mazzonis 1985,5). 
Despite their efficiency, Prato’s spot markets cannot deal effectively with 
all contingencies, especially when capacity is constrained. Large rush orders 
sometimes strain the system. In such cases, firms may simply pay their subcon- 
tractors more  to expedite their orders. In  other instances,  interpersonal  and 
family ties provide a “market override” mechanism that allows the orders to be 
filled, while other, less important orders are slightly delayed. Implicit is the 
understanding that the debt will eventually be repaid, either in future business 
or in special contract terms.36 Some of the larger Prato firms have invested in 
weaving  and finishing firms in order to ensure rapid  turnaround  on special 
orders for large customers. These relationships augment rather than replace the 
spot market in the Prato system. Although most transactions take place on what 
may be described as a spot market,  increases in equity cross-holdings  show 
that the spot market is not adequate for all the district’s transactions. 
The organization  of  the Prato textile industry has evolved  in response  to 
changes in technology, market demands, government regulations, and competi- 
tion from outside the district. Vertical disintegration created substantial needs 
for coordination among specialist firms. Mechanisms that have arisen to co- 
ordinate activities within the Prato district have allowed the district to gain the 
benefits  of a vertically  disintegrated  structure, while mitigating its disadvan- 
tages.  Geographic concentration  offers  reduced  transaction  costs  through 
lower communication and transportation costs. Standardized contracts reduce 
36. Lorenzoni  (1985) states that understanding  and trust  in the capabilities of others in  the 
district and the recognition of the need for mutual adjustment is characteristic of the Prato industry. 
dei Ottati (1987) emphasizes that cooperation between the district’s buyers and suppliers aids in 
the coordination within the Prato industry. Trust has its limits in the Prato system, however. Prato 
firms frequently spread disinformation  in  an attempt to gain advantage. Prato weavers, for ex- 
ample, often make inflated demand projections to induce spinners to  increase capacity, thus im- 
proving the weavers‘ bargaining position. A recent agreement among Prato spinners to hold the 
line on prices  fell apart almost instantly  as firms began to  undercut  each other. Jockeying for 
position through the selective use of disinformation is an acknowledged practice in the Prato in- 
dustry. 127  Organization and Coordination in  Geographically Concentrated Industries 
negotiating costs. Social relationships recognize the interdependence of firms 
and promote cooperation between vertical stages of  production, while fierce 
competition within each stage wrings inefficiency out of the system and forces 
firms to upgrade their expertise and equipment. The presence of hundreds of 
firms at each stage in the production process ensures essentially perfect com- 
petition at each stage of the process. According to ENEA (1985, 2), “The es- 
sence of the Prato system is competitive development.” The types of imitation 
and innovation described by Marshall flourish. Interfirm and interpersonal ri- 
valry within the district heightens the level of  c~mpetition.~~  Even with such 
tough competition, the repeated nature of firm interactions, the importance of 
reputation in obtaining orders, and rapid information flow among industry par- 
ticipants preclude overtly opportunistic behavior. 
Overall, the results have been impressive. The Prato system has proven bet- 
ter able to change from the production of commodities to the production of 
differentiated products than the textile industries in other European nations, 
which are not as localized or fragmented. The specifics of wool textile produc- 
tion, particularly the separability of productive stages, and the segments served 
by the Prato industry, particularly  fashion-related segments, have been amen- 
able to the fragmented  structure of  the  Prato  Prato firms remain 
unmatched in their ability to turn out short production runs of a wide variety 
of fabrics on short notice, making them ideal for the fashion-related segments 
of  the garment industry, with their short seasons and production runs. In the 
process, the Prato area has become one of the most prosperous areas in Italy 
and indeed in Western Europe. 
4.2.3  Coordination through Cartels and Consolidation: 
The Swiss Watch Industry 
In 1991, Switzerland accounted for 15 percent of worldwide production of 
watches by unit volume, but 52.8 percent of the value (7.4 billion francs out of 
14.0 billion) of world production. Japan, in contrast accounted for 46.6 percent 
of unit production and 25.6 percent of production by value. Hong Kong was 
the third leading producer, with a 20.5 percent unit production share and an 
8.6 percent value share. Switzerland accounted for 55.3 percent of world ex- 
ports (by value) of watches (FCdCration de l’industrie horlogkre suisse FH, pri- 
vate communication). The watch industry was concentrated in seven of Swit- 
zerland’s twenty-six cantons and half cantons. These seven cantons accounted 
for 89.8 percent of  the total employment in the Swiss watch industry in 1991 
(see  table  4.3).  The  low-  and  medium-priced  watch  firms  were  located 
throughout the Jura mountains in western Switzerland from Geneva to Schaff- 
37. Prato’s entrepreneurs compete for business and also for position in the local society. The 
leading entrepreneurs are also the town’s leading citizens. One Prato industrialist recently commis- 
sioned a poll to determine his standing in local public opinion. 
38. It is interesting to note that Italy has been internationally successful (with fragmented struc- 
tures) in other industries with similar attributes, such as footwear, apparel, leather goods, and even 
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Table 4.3  Employment in the Swiss Watch Industry, by Canton, 1991 
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hausen, whereas the luxury-watch producers were mostly located in Geneva, 
La VallCe de Joux, and Schaffhausen. 
Industry History 
The Swiss watch industry began in Geneva, whose jewelry makers and gold- 
smiths were known for their artistic flair and knowledge of metallurgy through- 
out the Middle Ages. The local gold and jewelry industries, however, declined 
sharply  in  1541 when John Calvin issued his famous edicts against luxury, 
pleasure, elegant clothing, and “useless” jewelry. Calvin’s edicts and a more 
detailed set of city regulations enacted twenty-five years later nearly put an end 
to the jewelry  and goldsmithing industries in Geneva. At roughly the same 
time, Huguenots fleeing religious persecution  in France, Italy, and Flanders 
arrived in the Swiss cantons. Among the refugees were a number of people 
who had been important watchmakers in their home countries. The smiths and 
jewelers of  Geneva began to make watches and clocks under the tutelage of 
the refugees in order to escape the ban on “useless” jewelry. The world’s first 
watchmaking  guild was founded in Geneva in  1601, and by  1700 there were 
already some five hundred watchmakers in the city. Genevan craftsmen ele- 
vated  watchmaking  to  an  art  form, with  watches  that  were  soon  known 
throughout the world. 
The Geneva industry developed a fragmented production process and ex- 
treme  division  of  labor in  what  became  known  as the  e‘tablissage system. 
Cardinal (1989) identifies approximately thirty specialized trades involved in 
the production of watches and clocks in Geneva at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Each trade supplied a particular component  (such as watch springs, 
chains, and dials) or performed a particular operation (such as movement as- 
sembly, engraving, and watchcase gilding). Production within each trade took 
place in small workshops in which a few workers were directed by a master 
craftsman. Etablisseurs coordinated production through a putting-out system 
and took charge of distribution and sales. This system encouraged the develop- 
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and watches. Cardinal concludes that this division of labor and coordination 
by the Ctablisseurs “ensured the success of Genevan watchmakers” (1989,57). 
Watch production spread from Geneva to the Jura area in the latter portion 
of  the seventeenth century. Daniel-Jean Richard and his family were said to 
have introduced the ttablissage system to the Jura, where watchmaking  pro- 
vided much needed employment in an area with long winters and limited ag- 
ricultural potential. By Richard’s death in 1741, hundreds, and later thousands, 
of artisans made individual watch components, which were assembled in work- 
shops located in nearby towns, such as Neuchitel, Bienne, and Solothurn. En- 
trepreneurs from these towns organized production and marketed the watches 
throughout Europe. The local industry grew dramatically; watch industry em- 
ployment  in Neuchitel grew from 464 in  1752 to more than  2,000 in  1778 
(Schweizer 1986 and sources within). Individual towns or valleys came to spe- 
cialize in particular components or even in watches for specific end markets. 
An 18  18 essay claimed that the advantage of the Jura region in watchmaking 
came from the “orderly coordination of the various work processes”  (quoted 
in Landes  1983, 263). Cardinal agreed, concluding that the rise of  the Jura 
watch industry depended on extreme division of labor and coordination by the 
etablisseurs (1989,60). The Swiss watchmaking towns had also begun to invest 
in education and training, setting up associations to promote the development 
of new designs and technology, while annual accuracy trials and invention con- 
tests spurred innovation in the industry (Schweizer 1986; Landes 1983). 
By  1790, annual production of  watches in the Jura reached approximately 
fifty thousand units. By 1817, the figure had doubled. The center of gravity of 
the Swiss watch industry had moved from Geneva to the Jura (which included 
the cantons of Neuchitel, Solothurn, Vaud, and Jura as well as part of Bern). In 
1790, six of  Switzerland’s cantons accounted for 92.1 percent of the industry’s 
employment of 39,336 watchworkers. By  1820, employment in the watch in- 
dustry had grown to 62,844. The leading cantons in terms of employment in 
1790 were Neuchitel with  34.8 percent of  the nation’s watchworkers,  Bern 
with  37.4 percent, Vaud  with 9.2 percent, and Geneva with 8.2 percent.  By 
1820, the six cantons accounted for 94.9 percent of Swiss watch industry ern- 
ployment, with Bern (41.5 percent), NeuchBtel(30.2 percent), Solothurn (10.1 
percent), Geneva (5.4 percent), and Vaud (5.3 percent) as the 1eade1-s.~~ 
Production methods for watches began to change in the nineteenth century. 
In the  1830s, machinery to make gears was introduced  to the Swiss watch 
industry.  Soon  the  Swiss  developed  machine  tools  to make parts  precise 
enough to be used interchangeably.  At first, these tools were used by  home- 
workers to improve precision and productivity. Eventually, the watchmakers 
began to group machine tools and workers together in a search for further effi- 
ciency gains. Between  1870 and  1910, the organization of the Swiss watch 
industry  shifted as factory production began to replace homework. By  1905, 
39. Calculated from Landes 1983, 380 and sources cited within. 130  Michael J. Enright 
there were thirty-eight thousand factory workers and twelve thousand home- 
workers  in  the  Swiss industry. For the first time, substantial investments  in 
fixed assets (watchmaking  equipment and machinery) were required to com- 
pete. Even though component production became mechanized, watch assem- 
bly  in  the Jura continued  to be dominated  by  small  firms  (Knickerbocker 
1972). In contrast, several leading luxury-watch manufacturers founded in or 
around Geneva in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were more integrated 
than  their  Jura  counterparts,  producing  intricate  hand-made  movements 
for their watche~.~"  These firms vertically integrated in order to achieve total 
control in the production of complicated watches and movements that could 
sometimes take years to complete. 
In the 1920s, in response to falling sales and rising unemployment  during 
the post-World  War I recession, Swiss watch companies organized themselves 
into several associations.  Watch assemblers and vertically  integrated watch- 
makers, the companies that sold completed watches to end markets, founded 
the FCdCration suisse des associations de fabricants d'horlogerie  FH in 1924. 
Seventeen kbuuche (unfinished watch movement) makers were organized into 
a trust, Ebauches SA, in 1926. Component suppliers grouped together to form 
the Union des branches annexes de l'horlogerie (UBAH), an association with 
eighteen separate subgroups for producers of different types of  components, 
in  1926. In  1928, the associations reached a series of  cartel agreements that 
controlled manufacturing, pricing,  and exporting within the Swiss watch in- 
dustry (Knickerbocker 1972,7). 
The depression of the  1930s and deteriorating conditions  in the industry 
created an unemployment problem in the watchmaking regions that prompted 
intervention  by  the  Swiss federal government. In  1931, the  government  in- 
vested in a holding company, the SociLtC gCnCrale de l'horlogerie  suisse SA 
(commonly known as ASUAG, the acronym of the German form of its name, 
Allgemeine schweizerische Uhrenindustrie), which in turn acquired the major- 
ity of  the  shares of  Ebauches SA and several leading component and watch 
manufacturers. In 1934, a federal statute ratified the industry's private controls 
and imposed new ones. FH members were allowed to make and sell finished 
watches. Ebauches SA was granted a monopoly on Cbauche production, except 
for vertically  integrated firms, which were allowed to manufacture Cbauches 
for internal use, but was forbidden to make or sell finished watches. FH mem- 
bers could buy components only from Ebauches SA or from UBAH (both of 
which  could only supply FH members)  unless parts  of  comparable  quality 
were available from foreign sources at prices 20 percent less than Swiss prices. 
UBAH and Ebauches SA sold components at specified prices that could be 
changed only through interassociation negotiations. FH members were forbid- 
40. Leading firms founded in the period included Blancpain and Vacheron Constantin (founded 
in the eighteenth century), Jaeger-Le  Coultre  (I  833), Patek Phillippe  (1  839). Audemars Piguet 
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den to price watches  below  a floor price  determined by  adding component 
costs, a standard manufacturing cost, and a 23 percent margin. FH firms also 
agreed to reduce nonprice competition by  limiting guarantees to one year on 
finished watches (Brengel and Rugo 1961). 
The Swiss government enforced industry price agreements and attempted to 
protect watchmaking skills and secrets. Government permits were required to 
manufacture  and export finished watches, movements, and components.  All 
mergers,  acquisitions,  and  new  plant  construction  required  government  ap- 
proval, as did exports of watchmaking machinery, tools, and designs for watch- 
making, a move that effectively froze the structure of the industry (bicker- 
bocker  1972,  8).  The  1934 law  gave  the  associations,  with  government 
backing, control over the industry. Several new associations eventually formed. 
The Chambre suisse de l’horlogerie  (Swiss watch chamber) represented  the 
entire industry in international trade matters and in the administration of fed- 
eral legislation. In addition to the Chambre suisse de l’horlogerie, FH, UBAH, 
and  Ebauches SA, were  the Association  d’industries  suisses  de la montre 
Roskopf, a group of manufacturers of inexpensive pin-lever watches; the DClC- 
gations rtunies (DR), which exercised general control over the industry’s col- 
lective agreements; and the Convention patronale, the employers’ organization 
that  negotiated  and administered  agreements governing wages  and working 
conditions with employees. 
At first, the cartel proved successful. The industry prospered as demand rose 
in the 1930s and  1940s,4’ and in the immediate postwar period, Swiss firms 
held an estimated 80 percent share of the world watch market. In the  1950s, 
however, the system started to break down. The fragmented structure hindered 
the adoption of the newest production techniques. Jura firms found it difficult 
to standardize parts or make the investments required to automate production. 
Some FH members began to complain that the arrangements protected  mar- 
ginal assemblers, fostered inefficiency among the component producers, and 
resulted in a deterioration of the Swiss quality image. In 1957, the resignation 
of seventy-two watch assemblers from the FH prompted the appointment of a 
government-sponsored  commission  to investigate their complaints.  In  1959, 
after several months of intensive discussions, a number of changes were made 
in the rules governing the watch industry. FH firms were allowed to use their 
own production costs rather than a standard cost in determining prices, but still 
had to add a 23 percent margin. Ebauches SA prices could be appealed to a 
joint FH-Ebauches  SA commission, while UBAH prices were now negotiated 
individually.  FH members were given the right to purchase  foreign parts of 
“acceptable quality” if (after tariff) they were 13 percent, rather than 20 per- 
cent, cheaper than Swiss parts. Integrated manufacturers were allowed to sell 
tbauches to each other, provided that they did not sell more than 60 percent of 
their output or purchase more than 60 percent of their total needs from other 
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integrated producers. This change allowed integrated manufacturers to achieve 
some economies of scale in tbauche production (Brengel and Rug0 1961). 
In 1961, the cartel law was repealed altogether. As of  1 January 1966, Swiss 
firms were free to expand, contract, merge, sell out to foreigners, or buy for- 
eign companies. A watch  standards committee was set up to ensure quality 
and maintain the reputation of the Swiss industry. The fixed-price system was 
abolished in  1966, and export permit requirements were phased out in 1971. 
The repeal of the cartel law changed the face of the Swiss watch industry. In 
the early  196Os, there were approximately 650 watch assemblers in Switzer- 
land, 17 manufacturers of tbauches (all members of Ebauches SA),  650 manu- 
facturers of special parts, and 500 other firms performing miscellaneous func- 
tions.  Three  groups,  Fabriques  d’assortiments  rtunies  SA  (escapement 
mechanisms), Fabriques de balanciers SA (balance wheels), and Groupements 
des fabricants suisses de spiraux (hairsprings), along with Ebauches SA sup- 
plied roughly three-quarters of the Swiss industry’s requirements for tbauches 
and separate parts. By 1971, after a series of mergers, eight watchmaking firms 
accounted for almost three-quarters  of  all Swiss watch exports. In the same 
year, ASUAG, the trust that controlled a majority interest in Ebauches SA and 
the three largest component companies, combined seven watch brands into a 
single firm.  The result was a direct link between companies that assembled and 
marketed watches with each other and with the component manufacturing sec- 
tor (Knickerbocker  1972, 11-12). 
The mergers, however, did not lead to changes in the underlying industry 
structure. Patterns  that emerged in the cartel days, when  the “Swiss  made” 
trademark meant unrivalled precision, persisted. There was little coordination 
among the various entities  that existed  under ASUAG and the other major 
holding company, SociCtC suisse pour I’industrie horlogkre (SSIH).42  Neither 
holding company had the power to enforce coordination among the different 
brands and suppliers. Limited production quantities resulted in inefficient pro- 
duction and limited planning.43  Although quality remained high, coordination 
among firms was poor. There were no standard orders, parts often had to be 
redone, and orders were often late. The holding company structure had allowed 
for the injection of capital from the government (which was unwilling to deal 
with the individual companies directly) and the large Swiss banks, but had not 
resulted in professional managerial control. 
Industry politics prevented the holding companies from acting against the 
old-line watch families, or “watch barons,” who retained control but did not 
push for increased efficiency. Several of the families had acquired the “right” 
(tradition more than ri&t)  to have family members employed by  the holding 
42. The SSIH was founded in  1930. By 1980. SSIH included brands like Tissot and Omega. 
43. The ttablisseurs tended to design watches that would require custom components. The result 
was lots that were often too small to justify the cost wf  tooling and dies. The specificity of  tooling 
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company. The prerogatives  of  each entity were respected; no rationalization 
took place. There were still seventeen tbauche factories in the late 1970s, for 
example, with overlapping product ranges and strategies that remained for the 
most part uncoordinated (Wilhelm Hill and Urs Bumbacher, private communi- 
cation). The mergers, in fact, represented an attempt to save the old structure, 
which had prevented market incentives from permeating the system of assem- 
blers and suppliers. The result was that the industry had neither the efficiency 
of a vibrant disintegrated structure, nor the coordination advantages of hierar- 
chy. Effective coordination at the level of  production had largely ceased to 
exist. The fact that the system persisted as long as it did was a monument to 
the magnitude of the lead the Swiss industry had developed against outside 
competitors.  Eventually, the rents that the  system was devised to distribute, 
and that had allowed the system to persist, vanished. 
The Swiss share of the world market decreased from 80 percent to around 
40 percent by the end of the  1960s. Bulova, which became successful in the 
1960s with the tuning-fork watch (developed by Swiss engineer Max Hertzel), 
and Timex, which sold more units than any other watch company in the world 
in  1970, had become important competitors. Despite losses in market share, 
growing demand kept capacity utilization and profits high in the Swiss indus- 
try. Prosperity disappeared, however, with the advent of the quartz watch in the 
mid-1970s. According  to Bumbacher  (1992),  after reaching  a new  peak  in 
sales of mechanical watches and movements in 1974, the Swiss watch industry 
virtually  collapsed. Swiss firms rejected the quartz watch movement (which 
had actually been developed in Switzerland) because they felt it was unrelia- 
ble, unsophisticated, and not consistent with Swiss standards. In addition, there 
was a fear that  scale-intensive  quartz technology would ruin  the  traditional 
fragmented industry structure and force many firms out of business. Vertically 
integrated foreign competitors had no such qualms. Seiko and Citizen (Japan) 
switched to quartz technology quickly and were soon followed by new compet- 
itors such as Casio (Japan) and Texas Instruments. Quartz technology under- 
went rapid improvement. Soon quartz watches exceeded the accuracy and re- 
liability  of  mechanical movements by a wide margin. New entry, aggressive 
expansion,  oversupply,  and  aggressive  pricing  caused  industry  prices  and 
profits to plummet. Swiss watch output fell drastically (see table 4.4). By 1980, 
the Swiss had lost their position  in low-priced and medium-priced watches, 
mostly  to Seiko and Casio (Bumbacher  1992, 18). Total employment in the 
Swiss watch industry fell from 89,448 in 1970 to 46,998 in  1980, and would 
fall to 32,253 by  1990. The Jura area was faced with an economic crisis. 
The need for a major restructuring of the Swiss watch industry became ap- 
parent. The restructuring was led by the large Swiss banks,44  federal and local 
governments, and a management team recruited from outside the industry. The 
losses of the late 1970s and early 1980s meant that the banks and governments 
44.  The large Swiss banks wrote off hundreds of millions of francs during the reorganization. 134  Michael J. Enright 
Table 4.4  Growth Rates in Watch and Watch-Movement Production 
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held control of the industry. The watch barons had seen their equity dissolve 
and were no longer a major factor. SSIH and ASUAG were joined to form the 
SociCtC suisse de microtlectronique et d’horlogerie SA (SMH) in 1983.45  The 
formation  of  SMH  involved  substantial  organizational  and  managerial 
changes. A controlling interest in SMH was sold to new CEO Nicholas Hayek 
and a friendly group of  Swiss investors. By the end of  1985, the bulk of the 
share capital was held outside the banking industry. SMH management took 
active  control,  rationalizing  and  modernizing  production,  reorganizing  the 
firm’s activities, and breaking down the barriers that had existed between sub- 
sidiaries. Production schedules were streamlined and coordinated, as were de- 
sign and marketing strategies. Finance, control, and production were managed 
centrally, while marketing  for each SMH brand was managed separately but 
coordinated  through an  SMH management  committee  (SMH controlled the 
Swatch, Rado, Certina, Omega, Tissot, Longines, ETA, Hamilton, Blancpain, 
F.  Piguet, Mido, and Flik Flak brands). 
SMH was far more vertically integrated than either of its predecessors had 
been (and as or even more vertically integrated than its foreign competitors), 
controlling subsidiaries that supplied movements, electronic components, spe- 
cialized integrated circuits, batteries, quartz oscillators, specialized materials, 
specialized machine tools, manufacturing systems, and distribution services. 
SMH’s vertical integration ensured that it would not have to rely on its foreign 
competitors  for key  components.  In  1983, for example, SMH founded EM 
Microtlectronique Marin SA to reduce its dependence on Japanese suppliers 
of specialized integrated circuits. Vertical integration was accompanied by in- 
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creased  differentiation  of  SMH’s products  as the  company  repositioned  its 
lines to give them a clear identity. Tissot, for example, became identified with 
watches made from natural materials such as rock and wood as well as special 
designs such as the two-timer, while Rado became known for futuristic designs 
and space-age materials. The new hierarchical organization was able to coordi- 
nate marketing programs in a way the old holding company structure could not. 
The new  organization allowed SMH management to rethink the function 
and production of the watch, something that could not be done in the vertically 
disintegrated structure. The result was the Swatch, a revolutionary concept for 
the low- and medium-priced watch segment. The Swatch, with its distinctive 
designs produced in limited series with new models every six months, turned 
the low-priced watch into a fashion accessory. By 1991, more than 100 million 
Swatches had been sold. SMH had become the largest watch company in the 
world, accounting for approximately a third of the output (sales) of the Swiss 
watch industry, a quarter of its employment, and roughly three-quarters of its 
value added. SMH had come to dominate the low- and medium-priced seg- 
ments of the Swiss watch industry and, with its Omega and Longines brands, 
had become the world’s second leading supplier of luxury watches. Only Rolex 
had greater sales in this latter category. 
Despite the great importance of SMH, there are several other firms in the 
Swiss  watch  industry  representing  different  organizational  forms.  Switzer- 
land’s luxury-watch  companies, which are mostly found in the Geneva area, 
have been  virtually  unchallenged  by  foreign competitors  for more than two 
hundred years. In the early 1990s, Swiss firms accounted for approximately 85 
percent of sales of luxury watches (FCdCration de l’industrie horlogkre suisse 
FH, private communication). Although several of the luxury-watch companies 
use  quartz  movements,  others  continue  to produce  handcrafted  mechanical 
masterpieces. Some of these firms act as pure assemblers, relying on a large 
number of small shops for virtually all components. Rolex produces many of 
its own components in-house, but relies on a single supplier (which  for the 
most part only supplies Rolex) for its watch movements. This supplier, in turn, 
purchases key components from SMH. Several other luxury-watch producers 
make their own movements. Jaeger-Le  Coultre SA, probably the most verti- 
cally integrated Swiss firm other than SMH, produces its own movements and 
most of  its own components, but relies on independent  suppliers for certain 
specialized components such as hands, dials, and crystals. 
The role  of  the  main  industry  associations  also  underwent  a  dramatic 
change. In 1983, the Chambre suisse de l’horlogerie and the FCdkration horlo- 
gkre suisse FH merged to form the present Fkdkration de l’industrie horlogkre 
suisse FH. The new  association’s primary  tasks were  to promote the  Swiss 
watch industry, to ensure foreign markets remained open to Swiss watches, to 
obtain and disseminate information on the industry, to fight the counterfeiting 
of well-known Swiss brands, and to protect the “Swiss made” trademark. The 
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nents. The association’s foreign repair shops were  turned over to the watch 
companies. 
Coordination in the Swiss Watch Industry 
As  in  the  Prato  textile  industry,  coordination  requirements  in  the  Swiss 
watch industry have depended on the nature of the product. Watches are com- 
plex products that contain between fifty and several hundred parts that must fit 
and work together with extreme precision. Coordination of production involves 
managing the design of  the watch, the specification and fabrication of compo- 
nents, watch  assembly, and scheduling each part  of  the process. This gives 
rise to a substantially more complex coordination task than that found in the 
textile industry. 
In the early days of the Swiss watch industry, itablisseurs organized produc- 
tion of  components and assembly of watches,  dealing with dozens of  home- 
workers  and  small  shops  to  coordinate  the  activities  of  the  industry.  The 
Ctablissage structure that developed first in Geneva and then in the Jura was 
closely  linked to the geographic concentration of  the watch  industry within 
Switzerland. The structure, with its market-mediated price  and quality stan- 
dards, provided  flexibility and variety  in its early days, and was retained  in 
the Jura area even as component production became mechanized. The early 
Ctablissage system allowed the Swiss watch industry to take advantage of ex- 
treme division of labor by providing a means of coordinating the activities of 
hundreds  and then  thousands  of  craftsmen. This system allowed  the  Swiss 
watch industry to attain and maintain its position of world leadership for more 
than two centuries. 
The importance of  the watch industry to local economies, fear of  outside 
competition,  and the  cooperation  inherent in the  system helped  lead to the 
formation of a cartel. From the 1920s through the 1960s, the activities of the 
Swiss watch firms were coordinated by negotiations within and among associa- 
tions of firms. The associations regulated competition, arbitrated differences 
among members, and spoke for the industry in its relations with government 
(Brengel and Rug0  1961, 12). The geographic concentration of  the industry 
allowed the firms to negotiate and monitor tightly the collusive arrangements. 
Proximity and interdependence had drawn the watch firms together. Informa- 
tion about the industry, and in particular about attempts to deviate from indus- 
try norms, traveled quickly through the watchmaking portion of northwestern 
Switzerland, though little information was shared with those outside the area. 
Geographic  concentration  also  prompted  government  intervention,  as  the 
Swiss government hoped its actions would improve employment prospects in 
an area that relied heavily on the watch industry. In freezing industry structure, 
the agreements ensured that watch production in the Jura area would remain 
fragmented. 
Inefficient  firms and organizations were protected by  fixed-price  arrange- 
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This combination of circumstances reduced incentives to innovate and reduced 
the chance that  innovations  would  be  adopted. The industry’s responses  to 
changes in markets and technology slowed. Over time, the Swiss industry lost 
much of its dynamism as coordination  was carried out more through a local 
political process than through markets or hierarchies. The fundamental struc- 
ture of  watch production  in much of  the Swiss industry, batch assembly  of 
mechanical  components,  became  obsolete  for  low-  and  medium-priced 
watches. The Jura-area watch industry was especially affected. Its fragmented 
structure prevented the development of scale and unity of purpose required to 
rationalize production  or make the large investments necessary  to introduce 
plastics and quartz movements. In addition, the Swiss system limited the incen- 
tive to improve and innovate. Ironically, the very effectiveness of this form of 
coordination within the cartel prevented competitive forces from making the 
Swiss firms adjust to changes in the product, technology, demand, and compe- 
tition until it was almost too late. 
Only with the advent of  SMH, a centralized, vertically integrated firm, did 
Switzerland regain a strong position in the low- and medium-priced watch seg- 
ment.  SMH’s activities  were  coordinated  through  its hierarchical  corporate 
structure; CEO and principal shareholder Nicholas Hayek remained involved 
in all major business decisions. The formation of SMH was the response of the 
system to changes that had been  going on in the industry for decades. The 
geographic concentration of the industry again played a role. The watch indus- 
try was so important to the economy of northwestern  Switzerland that aban- 
doning the industry was unthinkable. Coordination through much of the Swiss 
watch industry had passed from markets, to cartels, to modern corporate man- 
agement. 
4.3  Conclusions 
Geographic concentration, or localization, in industry is a widespread and 
complex phenomenon.  There is a close relationship between localization and 
the structure of firms and industries. Geographic concentration within an in- 
dustry may influence the boundaries between firms by increasing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of coordination across firms. It reduces the transaction costs 
associated with spot markets and the formation of short-term coalitions based 
on a nexus of contracts by reducing the costs of negotiations as well as reduc- 
ing the likelihood of  ex post opportunistic behavior. Finally, geographic con- 
centration can also foster the formation of cartels by making the arrangements 
easier to monitor and enforce. Localized industries therefore provide a unique 
opportunity to examine coordination within and among firms. 
The organizational  forms and coordinating mechanisms employed by  the 
industries profiled have shifted with changes in product, technology, markets, 
competition, and government actions. The interaction is complex; it is difficult 
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technology, product market strategy, industry structure, and optimal coordina- 
tion mechanisms are jointly determined. Each motion picture is a unique proj- 
ect that brings together a multitude of  parties. Textiles are produced in a num- 
ber of separable stages. Watches are complex products that contain many parts 
that must fit together with extreme precision. The nature of the product creates 
particular coordination requirements that influence coordination mechanisms. 
The greater complexity of coordination  in the watch compared to the textile 
industry helps explain why the Swiss watch industry vertically integrated and 
the Prato textile industry disintegrated. The formation of cartels and associa- 
tions that froze the structure of the Swiss watch industry, however, delayed this 
integration until the rents that propped up the system were no longer available. 
In  Hollywood,  the  temporary  nature  of  each project  has fostered  a certain 
amount of disintegration. 
Changes in the external competitive environment provided a stimulus for 
changes in organization and coordination in the industries described. The loss 
of markets due to protection  and greatly increased competition from the Far 
East reduced the viability of long production runs of low-quality wool fabrics 
in Prato. The Swiss watch industry was forced to restructure in the  1980s by 
competition from American and Asian competitors. Competition from televi- 
sion forced the Hollywood motion picture industry to try to differentiate mo- 
tion  pictures  from  television  shows  through  the  creation  of  the big-budget 
blockbuster film. Although each of the three industries has shown an ability to 
change from within, external competitive pressure figured prominently in the 
most  dramatic of  the  changes in organization  and coordination  in each in- 
dustry. 
The evolution of firm strategy also influenced organization  and coordina- 
tion. Changes in the degree of  vertical  integration were associated  with the 
development of greater levels of product  differentiation  in each of  the three 
industries  profiled.  In  Hollywood  and  Prato,  increased  differentiation  was 
accompanied  by  a decrease in  levels of  vertical  integration,  whereas  in the 
low-priced segment of the Swiss watch industry, increased differentiation was 
associated  with  an increase  in  vertical  integration.  In  the first two cases,  a 
disintegrated structure has proven better able to generate variety and flexibility. 
In the third, it took a vertically integrated firm to develop and carry out a strat- 
egy that brought fashion to low-priced watches. The main difference is that in 
textiles and motion pictures variety is linked to a production process with lim- 
ited economies of scale, at least for the segments served by Prato and Holly- 
wood, while the Swatch process is scale intensive, but permits flexibility  in 
colors and styles around a limited number of base designs. 
Government policies have influenced organization and coordination in the 
three industries. Antitrust enforcement unleashed  a chain of events that dra- 
matically influenced the structure of the Hollywood motion picture industry. 
The Swiss government codified and supported the Swiss watch cartel. Italy’s 
artisan-firm laws favored the formation of small disintegrated firms. The indus- 139  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
try  examples also show that  government  action  has had  unforeseen  conse- 
quences. The Paramount decision forced the studios to divest their theaters, 
but it was the uncertainty that this divestiture entailed, not the decision itself, 
that caused the studios to separate production and distribution. Italy’s restric- 
tive labor laws accelerated the process of disintegration in the Prato industry 
by making it difficult for large firms to operate in a cyclical industry. The Swiss 
government’s efforts to support the watch cartel eventually contributed to the 
ossification of the industry. 
The examples show that there is no single natural progression through which 
industries develop. While portions of the Swiss watch industry eventually con- 
solidated into a vertically integrated managerial firm, the Prato textile industry 
and the Hollywood motion picture industry did just the opposite. The examples 
also show that geographic concentration does not in and of itself determine the 
boundaries of firms, but may allow for a range of productive organizations and 
a fluidity between organizational forms. Competing organizational forms and 
coordination mechanisms have coexisted in the three industries. In Prato, for 
example, fragmented production organized by impannatori existed even when 
the industry  was  dominated by  vertically  integrated  firms. Today, however, 
there are no vertically integrated textile firms in the Prato wool textile industry. 
There were vertically  integrated Swiss watch firms in the low- and medium- 
priced segments in the days when assemblers and fragmented production were 
dominant. Today, however, the importance of fragmented production processes 
in the Swiss watch industry has diminished. There were some important in- 
dependent producers in Hollywood’s studio era. Today, independent and studio 
production coexist. The persistence of competing organizational forms may be 
related to the selection environment faced within the industry. The textile and 
watch industries have provided particularly tough selection environments for 
alternative organizational forms, whereas the uncertainty inherent in the mo- 
tion  picture  industry  contributed  to the persistence  of  alternative organiza- 
tional forms. 
Different  organizational  forms appear to have different abilities to foster 
or react to innovation. Fragmented  structures appear to be quite flexible and 
adaptable to incremental innovation and change, such as changes in fashion, 
that do not require the rethinking of the entire product or production process. 
Fragmented  structures on the other hand may not allow for the rethinking of 
an entire product and process. Small producers that focus on a single stage of 
production will not work on developments that eliminate their stage. Compa- 
nies in other stages may not have the inclination or money to do so. The devel- 
opment of the decentralized structure of the Prato textile industry was accom- 
panied by innovations and changes in marketing, but did not involve substantial 
changes in production processes. The Hollywood motion picture industry has 
seen technological and market changes, but has not had to rethink the entire 
production process. The advent of the quartz watch movement, on the other 
hand, required a dramatic reappraisal of the entire process of watch manufac- 140  Michael J. Enright 
ture. The fragmented, collusive structure of the industry made it difficult to 
adapt to new circumstances. The Swiss watch firms proved too shortsighted to 
adopt the quartz movement until it was almost too late. Only a dramatic and 
painful restructuring, led by  management from outside the industry, allowed 
the Swiss to regain a strong position in the low- and medium-priced segments 
of  the watch industry. A group of localized firms may go into decline if the 
firms become ossified and too inwardly focused, and lose sight of their compet- 
itors and markets. This should serve as a warning to those that would view 
geographic clusters of small firms as a panacea for the problems of economic 
development, 
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Comment  Kenneth L. Sokoloff 
Over the past decade, there has been a welcome revival of interest in the inte- 
gration of geographic variables into economic analysis. Several developments 
have contributed to this now unmistakable trend. Foremost among them is the 
apparent success of Japan and several other East Asian countries at cultivating 
world-class export-oriented industries behind trade barriers to foreign compe- 
tition in their home markets. Both politicians and policy-oriented economists 
have suggested that this record  reflects the existence of  external economies 
operating at the industry level and within geographic units such as regions or 
nations.  These gut  reactions  to real-world  observations  have  been  comple- 
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mented  nicely  by  advances  on  a different  front-where  abstract but  well- 
meaning mathematical economists have been slogging around in the trenches. 
In their quest for a general theory of  growth, they found that they could ele- 
gantly close their models with  external economies of  scale; moreover, they 
noted at least a superficial consistency of  this  sort of model with the cross- 
sectional evidence-high  rates of economic growth among nations with high 
levels of per capita income and very low rates of growth among those with 
low incomes. 
Of course, a major impetus to further study of  the subject has also come 
from  the  observation  that  some  of  today’s  most  dynamic  industries in  the 
United States, such as biotechnology and personal computers, are geographi- 
cally concentrated in a few areas. Since these industries are intensive in human 
capital instead of a traditional immobile factor like iron ore or warm climate, 
there has been a tendency to attribute such spatial concentration to the opera- 
tion of external economies. The magnitude and prevalence of such geographic 
externalities are not only relevant to issues of regional and national economic 
development, but also to questions concerning the boundaries, activities, and 
organizations of firms. If spatial clustering influences the costs of transacting 
or of coordinating the efforts of different agents or firms, many aspects of the 
behavior of these firms and agents could be affected, including how they orga- 
nize their production, their locations, the characteristics of their products, their 
techniques of production, and the rates at which they invent or innovate. 
As scholars have grown increasingly convinced of the significance of exter- 
nal economies operating at the local or regional level, they have had to confront 
our limited empirical knowledge of the subject. Virtually no systematic investi- 
gations have been conducted, so basic questions as to the source or specific 
content of  externalities, the ease with which districts can realize them, their 
magnitude, the range of industries affected, and their durability over time re- 
main unanswered. For this reason, Michael Enright’s work is especially wel- 
come. His paper is but one from a broad project on the localization of indus- 
tries,  and in  it he recounts  the evolution  of  the  organization  of  three case 
industries that have long and fascinating histories of being geographically con- 
centrated. In doing so, Enright discusses the relationships between an indus- 
try’s degree of geographic clustering and the structure of  its firms as well as 
the coordination mechanisms it employs. Although his treatment is not com- 
prehensive, he also elucidates some of the competitive advantages that firms 
in certain types of industries enjoy when they are located in close proximity to 
one another. His principal  hypothesis is that geographic proximity enhances 
the effectiveness  of  coordinating activities of agents through markets as op- 
posed to relying on hierarchical structures within firms for coordination. Geo- 
graphic proximity  is of course only one of many factors that influence  the 
degree of vertical integration, but Enright suggests that this effect is sufficient 
to account for a greater diversity in the organization of localized industries than 
one observes in nonlocalized industries. He notes how geographic clustering is 144  Michael J. Enright 
advantageous for the operation of  spot markets which facilitate the bringing 
together of  teams of producers for short-term projects. The clear implication 
is that industries with short production runs will tend to be more geographi- 
cally concentrated. 
Enright’s presentations of three case studies are elegant. But the paper high- 
lights how economists’ desire to establish simple lines of causation between 
geographic concentration and the organizational forms or coordinating mecha- 
nisms employed by industries may be frustrated by problems of simultaneity. 
While  geographic  localization may  encourage  more disintegrated industrial 
structures, part of  the empirical association must be due to the tendency  for 
workers in industries whose outputs are best produced (for either technological 
or demand-based reasons) in small batches or short bursts  of  time to locate 
near one another so as to facilitate contracting and fuller employment through- 
out the year. Similarly, although the extent of geographic concentration and the 
reliance on short-term coalitions for production will be influenced by the path 
of  technical change, the character of the competition in both the factor and 
output markets, and government policy, the latter variables will in turn be par- 
tially  determined in the long run by the historical  structure of  the industry. 
The simultaneity problem notwithstanding, Enright’s emphasis on the line of 
causation  from geographic  concentration  to the  method  of  coordination  is 
probably  warranted  in his examples of filmmaking in Hollywood and wool 
textiles in Italy-where  the organizations of long-localized industries clearly 
became more disintegrated over time. 
There is a powerful logic to Enright’s argument. However, the familiar ques- 
tion of  sample selection should be considered before drawing general infer- 
ences from this study. Although Enright identifies a number of features com- 
mon  to  his  three  cases  and  outlines  an  appealing  intuitive  approach  to 
understanding the linkages between organizational structure and localization, 
it is not at all clear that the Prato wool textile industry, the Swiss watch industry, 
and the Hollywood film industry are representative of geographically concen- 
trated industries. Moreover, there is no systematic comparison with a control 
group of nonlocalized industries. If his goal is only to establish that diversity 
exists in the organizational structure of localized industries, then the lack of 
representativeness  of  his case studies and the lack of  a control group do not 
matter and he succeeds admirably. If, however, he entertains the more ambi- 
tious agenda of establishing how firms in localized industries differ systemati- 
cally from others in their form of organization, or demonstrating that any such 
difference  is quantitatively  or qualitatively  important, then  there  may  be  a 
problem with his evidence. 
For example, all three of his localized industries are characterized over the 
time period he focuses on by rather small scales and limited runs of production, 
as well as by  labor forces with substantial individual  investments  in  human 
capital. In such a technological  context, one would indeed expect that there 145  Organization and Coordination in Geographically Concentrated Industries 
would be frequent expirations of old contracts and entrances into new ones- 
in order that all parties remain as fully employed as possible. Moreover, it is 
reasonable that industries in such technological  circumstances would tend to 
be located in geographic clusters so as to reduce the transactions costs involved 
in recontracting-just  as traders in a capital market tend to gather in the same 
locations to facilitate their trading. 
My unease arises from the many cases of  localized industries that do not 
resemble those treated by Enright: Los Angeles and aeronautical engineering 
for the military; New York and investment houses; Warsaw, Indiana, and arti- 
ficial limbs and joints; Detroit and automobiles; Pittsburgh and steel; Silicon 
Valley  and  computer hardware;  Hamamatsu,  Japan,  and  motorcycles;  and 
many other pairs. Admittedly  none of  these industries is perfectly  vertically 
integrated, but they are nevertheless far from being characterized by fluid firm 
boundaries, small scale, fragmented production processes, or many of the other 
features that  are associated  with Enright’s case studies. Instead, they reflect 
technological contexts other than those considered by Enright that would also 
serve to encourage the localization of industries. Examples of such other con- 
texts include situations where a locality has a relative abundance of some rela- 
tively fixed factor of production for which there is no good substitute, or where 
technical change is rapid and the firms cluster geographically to keep abreast 
of the frontiers of knowledge and technology by  means of informal channels 
through which information diffuses spatially. 
The existence of nonlocalized industries characterized by extensive subcon- 
tracting also presents problems for Enright’s analysis. The practice of obtaining 
parts from remote, independent, and diverse sources to assemble in yet another 
location is now widespread in many manufacturing industries, and analogous 
arrangements are also evident in the service sector. The increasing prevalence 
of this sourcing pattern raises the possibility that immediate geographic prox- 
imity may not actually have a large effect on the relative costs of alternative 
methods of coordinating factors of production. It also reinforces the view that 
a more  systematic empirical  investigation  is necessary  in order to establish 
Enright’s hypothesis  about the association between  geographic concentration 
and the organization of the industry. 
Concern about problems of sample selection is further heightened by  En- 
right’s suggestion that a review of  his case studies supports the conclusion 
that small, disintegrated firms respond more quickly to incremental changes in 
technology or fashion, while larger, integrated enterprises have the advantage 
in adapting to revolutionary changes. As one who has been following the for- 
tunes of mammoth firms like General Motors, IBM, and Sears and Roebuck, I 
find the proposition odd. The case of IBM appears especially telling, because 
this company appears to have been overwhelmed by the revolutionary changes 
in the power and design of computers, while the smaller gadflies in the industry 
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Despite these caveats, I commend Enright for his pioneering efforts to study 
systematically the phenomenon of localized industries and its association with 
the ways in which firms are organized and in which technology evolves and is 
diffused. These are extremely important,  if complex, subjects, and his work 
will advance our understanding of them. 